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David Bell: Fenwick's 2021 Corporate Governance Survey
Episode 53
Published 4 years, 3 months ago
Description
- Intro.
- (1:35) - Start of interview.
- (2:22) - David's "origin story". He grew up as an "army brat" including living in Germany for about 10 years. He went to high school in West Point, NY. He stayed to go to college in Buffalo, where he also got his MBA. He left the Army and came to CA, where he ran IT for a company. He eventually went to law school first to Santa Clara, and then to UC Davis.
- (4:17) - His experience joining Fenwick in 1997, "in the front-end of the dot-com boom getting started." "I learnt a lot in the bubble years, and it was a tremendous advantage to my career to have done that early on."
- (5:32) - On the origin of Fenwick's Corporate Governance Surveys (published externally starting in 2007). "It was started to provide more than anecdotal advice to clients." The Mercury News published the SV150 List (a list of the largest Silicon Valley companies measured by revenue), and the idea was to compare and contrast that list with the S&P 100 (comprising 100 major blue chip companies across multiple industry groups.)
- (11:41) - On boardroom diversity: The percentage of women directors is now almost identical for the SV150 (30.3%, up from 25.7% in 2020) and S&P 100 (30.2%, up from 28.7% in 2020). On the impact of institutional investors in this change, SB-826 and AB-979 in CA, and the Nasdaq's diversity rule. "Silicon Valley had been behind in gender diversity. Institutional investor attention was the largest driver of increasing gender diversity on boardrooms."
- (16:15) - On dual-class share structures. The adoption of dual-class shares has emerged as a recent clear trend among Silicon Valley technology companies (from 2.9% in 2011 to 21.3% in 2021, as opposed to S&P 100 that where it decreased from 9% in 2011 to 8% in 2021). Per Prof. Jay Ritter data, 46.2% of all 2021 tech IPOs had dual class share structures.
- (23:05) - On the prevalence (and complexities) of dual-class share structures in private companies.
- (26:43) - On directors getting more than one vote ("disproportionate voting rights amongst directors"). Note DGCL 141(d).
- (29:17) - The Peloton case and how dual-class shares may impact shareholder activism.
- (31:46) - On sunset provisions for dual-class shares. "The Council of Institutional Investors' 7-year sunset provision is not convincing, 10-12 years is more convincing due to a variety of factors, including investments in R&D and traditional growth horizons."
- (35:11) - On staggered (or classified) boards: Over the period from 2004 through 2021 proxy seasons, staggered boards have dropped from around 45% to just 3% in S&P100, while they have increased to 52.1% in SV150 companies. "This is a perfect example of why 'best practices