Episode Details
Back to EpisodesOpinion Summary: T.M. v. UMD MSC | Rooker-Feldman Bars T.M.'s Lawsuit
Description
T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026
Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.
Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction.
Main Arguments:
T.M. (Petitioner):
- (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman;
- (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments;
- (3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar.
UMD Medical System (Respondent):
- (1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review;
- (2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed;
- (3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent.
Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed.
Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
- (1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement;
- (2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes;
- (3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury.
Separate Opinions:
- Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments.
- Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan an