Episode Details

This is the analysis from the bank's side — how the fee revenue from a prime brokerage relationship corrupts the risk committee's ability to ask the question that would end it. What a GP or LP requires in counterparty onboarding before the margin call makes the question irrelevant.The concentration was visible in the stock price movement. The swap structure was a known instrument. The counterparty gap — nine prime brokers each seeing only their own slice — was an architectural feature, not an accident.

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Credit Suisse chose the fee over the question. This episode dissects the Archegos total return swap architecture, the distributed prime brokerage counterparty gap, and the three institutional signals that indicated a $160 billion concentrated position before the margin call ended it in forty-eight hours. GP/LP analysis. Prime brokerage risk. Family office due diligence. Swap counterparty exposureBill Hwang didn't hide the position. He distributed it. Six prime brokers simultaneously, each seeing only its own slice of a thirty-six billion dollar concentrated bet on the same stocks. Each bank thought they had a manageable counterparty. None of them knew they were all financing the same trade. Financial Forensics Labs — GP/LP Analysis. Every collapse has a pattern. We dissect it. Layer by layer.