Episode Details

Study Guide

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbi) interprets the first mention of “bull” in Vayikra 4:20 as referring to the bull offering of Yom Kippur, even though the verse’s context concerns the communal sin offering. According to Rebbi, this verse teaches that the Yom Kippur bull is comparable to the bull brought by the kohen gadol who sins, referenced by the second mention of “bull” in the same verse.

Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rebbi, arguing that the laws of the Yom Kippur bull can be derived through kal va’chomer (a fortiori) reasoning. However, the kal va’chomer argument he proposes is not fully spelled out in the text, and the Gemara clarifies which cases are being referenced and what laws are derived.

Since Rabbi Yishmael does not interpret the word “bull” as referring to the Yom Kippur offering, but rather to the communal sin offering, the question arises: why use the term “bull” instead of simply saying “it”? Rav Pappa explains that the unnecessary word comes to teach a law not explicitly stated in the verses about the communal offering, but found in the kohen gadol’s sin offering - that the lobe of the liver and the kidneys are burned on the altar. Although this law could have been derived by juxtaposition, the inclusion of the word “bull” makes it as though it were written explicitly, which then allows it to be used to derive the same law by juxtaposition to the communal sin offering for idol worship.

A braita is brought to support Rav Pappa’s explanation and shows how the juxtaposition between the communal sin offering and the communal offering for idol worship (from Bamidbar 15:25) is established. However, another braita derives the juxtaposition from the verse in Vayikra 4:20. Both derivations are considered necessary, as each teaches a different law.

Rebbi’s position is cited earlier to support Rav Pappa’s explanation that the word “bull” serves to compare the Yom Kippur bull to the kohen gadol’s sin offering for specific laws derived from the words “et,” “b’dam,” and “taval.” However, Rebbi himself states that the comparison teaches that all the laws are the same, not just those three. This discrepancy is explained as stemming from two different tannaitic positions.

Two braitot from the school of Rabbi Yishmael are brought, each explaining why certain words or laws appear only in the kohen gadol’s sin offering and not in the communal one. Both are interpreted through parables that reflect God’s relationship with His people.

Finally, a Mishna in Menachot presents a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding whether a pigul (disqualifying intent) during the taking of the handful of the meal offering, but not during the taking of the frankincense (or vice versa), renders the offering pigul. Reish Lakish explains Rabbi Meir’s position: the offering becomes pigul not because intent during part of the matir (the enabling act) can render an offerin