Episode Details

This week Bill and I have a special guest with us, he’s been here before and we always love to have him, he’s the one, the only, my good buddy, Jon Parshall.

This week we are going to take a step back from the battlefront, into the backwaters if you will, to discuss some of the leaders of WATCHTOWER, the men who made the decisions, for better or worse, that propelled, and sometimes didn’t propel the all-encompassing campaign.

Talking Points

Ghormley

1. Nimitz nominates Ghormley as COMSOPAC for future operations in April 1942
2. Ghormley had previously acted as a special naval observer in Britain and desired to stay in the European theater.
3. Highly intelligent and a savy negotiator, he had almost zero tactical command experience.
4. He had never held an operational post despite being a Vice Admiral
5. Ghormley was in over his head as COMSOPAC
6. Ghormley receives word to prepare for what would become WATCHTOWER and immediately greets it with pessimism.
7.  Nimitz showed a lot of confidence in Ghormley initially.  Essentially granting him free reign to establish himself and his operations to prepare for the offensive.
8. The very next day, Nimitz received a copy of a letter from Ghormley to King that stated that the timeline for the operation was “unrealistic” and that both Ghormley and MacArthur were doubtful as to the success of the operation and had the “gravest doubts” about the plan.
9. This had to have shaken Nimitz’s confidence in Ghormley as a leader.
10. Regarding the July pre-invasion meeting: the sheer fact that Ghormley declined to attend this incredibly important meeting personally should have been a red flag.
11. Despite being told by Nimitz to command “in person” Ghormley sends Callaghan.
12. This pattern of non-personal leadership causes issues right away…
13. The issue of Turner and Fletcher going after one another in the July meeting over how long the CVs should remain in the area is one example of how things turned to shit quickly.
14. Ghormley “suggested” to Fletcher to leave 2 VF Squadrons on Henderson if the field is ready. BUT…if enemy CVs appear then they are the priority.  
15. As a result of this confusing memo, Fletcher thought he had the approval to maneuver independently and Turner thought that COMSOPAC had assured him that Fletcher would cover the landings until Henderson was operational.  Had Ghormley been present, his intentions would have become known by his own voice.  But alas, that was not to be…
16. After Savo, which you could technically throw blame on Ghormley, Ghormley acted scared and ordered his surface forces all the way back to Noumea, 1000 miles away.
17. He told Nimitz he could not protect the sea lanes requested air support.
18. In truth, Ghormley had no fucking clue what was going on…
19. In messages to Nimitz, Ghormley constantly pleaded for reinforcements, always stating that the forces on Guadalcanal were just barely hanging on…
20. Consistently, Nimitz urged Ghormley to be more active…yet he sat on the Argonne and roasted in his hot quarters
21. Most of his message stank of anxiety and near desperation, and he never seemed to know what was going on.
22. Had he gone to Guadalcanal, maybe just once, he would have had a better understanding
23. Nimitz decided to visit Ghormley on September 25 he arrived 3 days later to find the logistics situation a complete mess.
24. When Nimitz met with Ghormley, the latter’s physical state shocked Nimitz.
25. He was pale, and gaunt, he had dental problems, lived aboard an old, cramped ship with no air circulation and refused to acquire land space for his HQ because of the French not wanting to give the land over to him.
26. Nimitz flew to Guadalcanal the next day, returned to Noumea and told Ghormley how optimistic the men were, and urged him to be more assertive.
27. Wh