Episode Details

This week Bill and I have a special guest with us, he’s been here before and we always love to have him, he’s the one, the only, my good buddy, Jon Parshall.

If you’ve been listening to the podcast as of late, you are well aware that we are making our way through the slug fest that was the Guadalcanal campaign.  While the fighting ashore has raged on and off between pitched engagements, the seas around the Canal have been anything but quiet.  Savo Island in August was a debacle for the US Navy, the carrier forces under Admiral fletcher landed some fairly significant blows on the Japanese carrier force at Eastern Solomons, and Admiral Norman Scott finally exacted some revenge for Savo at the Battle of Cape Esperance.  The US Navy has seen it’s share of victories, as well as defeats in these bloody waters.  And while the fighting has been significant at sea…it ain’t over.  Not even close.  

The calendar now sits in October 1942, October 26 exactly.  And ashore, the Japanese have launched a massive offensive to finally push the Marines and Army off Guadalcanal.  The October offensive and the fighting that takes place ashore will be remembered as the Battle of Henderson Field.  The fighting at sea that takes place only a day later, all coinciding with the offensive ashore, will be called the Battle of Santa Cruz.

Talking Points:

Japanese Preparations and Plans Pre-Battle:

• The combined fleet sorties from Truk on October 11.  The force is very large, the largest Japanese force that has put to sea since Midway and consists of 4 CVs and 1 light CV
• 3 Fleet CVs
• 1 Light CV
• 4 BBs
• 8 CAs
• 2 CLs
• 24 DDs
• The Japanese had planned that the naval force that was now at sea would not necessarily support the operation ashore, but would directly benefit from the success of the ground offensive
• That being said, once Hyakutake’s infantry had captured Henderson, the Japanese combined fleet would then be free from any attack from land based air.
• The pre-sailing plans called for the Japanese so-called Support Force to make a high-speed run into the Guadalcanal area to intercept and destroy any American fleet units that would come to the rescue of the infantry following the Japanese land-based offensive’s success.
• This is part of the reason why Kongo and Haruna blasted the shit out of Henderson on October 14-15.  Both to soften the defenses, destroy the airfield and also, hopefully draw the Americans out to fight.
• Japanese intel, which we have not talked about very much, had deduced via traffic patterns that at least 1 US CV was in the Canal area.
• Based on traffic patterns, the Japanese had seen a large flurry of messages go out to a “powerful unit” south of Guadalcanal that would receive the messages and maintain radio silence.
• This of course is CV8
• Again, based on traffic patterns, the Japanese had deduced that another major fleet unit had sailed from Pearl Harbor on or about Oct 15.
• This is the newly repaired CV6
• The Japanese estimated that this task force was headed south as well to join up with the other “ghost” force
• Japanese. Intel also read US newspapers and listened to the news, as US officials ignorantly declared on October 20 that US Naval forces off Guadalcanal were preparing for a “sea clash”

The Land influences the Sea

• Delays ashore from the Japanese 17th Army (future Henderson Field offensive force) caused Y-Day to be pushed from October 19 to the 22nd.  
• Incidentally, Hiyo suffers a fire in her engineering spaces that causes her to return to port and not take part in the planned upcoming action.
• 17th Army again delays the offensive until the 24th further irritating the IJN.
• The delay by the Army forced the Navy to delay its attack which allowed CV6 to rejoin the American for