Episode Details

On the night of October 11, 1942, the Japanese sent two separate task forces heading in the direction of Guadalcanal.  The first task force was yet another troop/resupply convoy, the second task force, separate from the first yet in the same area at the same time, was a bombardment group assigned to shell Henderson field.  

The Japanese, at this time, rulers of the seas around Guadalcanal, at least at night anyway, did not believe that an American task force would be in the area.  Latest intel told them that the Americans were off to the north and not near the beaches.  The intelligence was wrong. 

Set Up:

• The Japanese have been making steady resupply runs, at night, to their forces on Guadalcanal since Edson’s Ridge.  
• These supply runs are the buildup for the eventual “showdown” that is scheduled to take place in mid to late October, October 20 to be exact.
• Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, of Savo fame, was in overall command of the operation set for the night of October 11-12.
• His field commander if you will, is Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto
• Goto is in command of the bombardment force which consists of:
• 3 CAs and 2 DDs

• American intel has picked up on the Japanese plans to build forces for an all-out assault on the airfield.  Realizing that the Marines would be hard-pressed to hold out against another massive assault, Army General Millard Harmon, CO of US Army in the South Pacific, convinces Admiral Ghormley, whom we shall discuss at a later date, that the Marines need the Army’s help.
• Ghormley agrees and sends the Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division to Guadalcanal to reinforce the Gyrenes.
• The date for the reinforcement is set for October 8 
• To protect the convoy carrying the soldiers, Ghormley assigns a cruiser/destroyer group under the command of Admiral Norman Scott to protect them.
• Scott’s forces include:
• 2 CAs, 2 CLs, 5 DDs
• Scott’s orders are to protect the convoy and once the Army is delivered, patrol the waters off Guadalcanal , intercept and then destroy anything that attempts to move in
• ADM Scott knew that his mission carried with it, two tasks aside from the destruction of any Japanese force
• Develop night surface doctrine
• Revenge
• As far as doctrine was concerned, Scott was aware that he and his units, lacked any real experience or training in night actions.  Therefore, his plan for action, should it be needed, was simple:
• Steam in a column with DDs ahead in the van, followed by the cruisers
• DDs would illuminate targets after radar contact, fire torpedoes and allow the CAs to concentrate on the enemy heavies

• Scott chose the USS San Francisco (CA-38) as his flagship, when he should have probably chosen either Helena or Boise
• Helena and Boise were both equipped with new SG radar units, as opposed to the SC aboard Frisco
• Faulty intel said that the Japanese had sets that could track American radar and as a result he ordered that the radar on Frisco be turned off (!!)

The Fight:

• On October 9 and 10th Scott was patrolling the area just north of Renell island, out of range of Japanese search planes
• Each night he entered Savo sound but turned back because of no reported Japanese activity
• On the 11th, search planes from Guadalcanal sighted the incoming Japanese troop reinforcement convoy and reported it as 2 CAs and 6DDs.
• Scott receives this intel and prepares to maneuver his ships into the Savo island area to do battle that night

• At sundown, Scott orders his ship to GQ, determined to not be surprised by the Japanese like at Savo on August 8

• Prior to action, Scott wisely decided to launch most of his scout planes and send them to Guadalcanal.