Episode Details

While the hit and run carrier raids of February and March tested American carrier doctrine to an extent, and the Pearl Harbor raid as well as Indian Ocean raids tested Imperial Navy doctrine also to an extent, this is the very first time that both navies tested each other’s way of doing things, and in the process found things that worked, and things that well…didn’t work.  Let’s dig into it…

Talking Points:

• What sets off the battle of Coral Sea?

o Outline Japanese plans for Operation MO

 Japanese wanted to seize Port Moresby and all of New Guinea.  By doing this, it would provide Japan with both a way to isolate Australia as well as New Zealand from allied supply lines, specifically American supply lines.  

• Why Rabaul (Opeation R) wasn’t good enough

 This was to be prefaced by the Japanese capture of Tulagi, which is an island we will hear a lot about in the near future.  By capturing Tulagi, in the Solomons, the Japanese could patrol the area and the sea lanes to Port Moresby so as to allow their invasion force a free hand.

 As part of the Port Moresby invasion attempt, the invasion group was to be covered by two separate carrier groups, one which centered around the light carrier Shoho, and another which centered around the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku.

o US intel at Station HYPO and fleet radio unit Melbourne, or FRUMEL decrypt Japanese messages to an extent, and in turn believe that the Japanese will strike the area of Port Moresby, or the northern coast of Australia on or about the first week of May.

 As a result of this intel, Nimitz deploys the only two carrier task forces at his disposal at this time, those centered around USS Lexington, and USS Yorktown, TF 11 and TF 17 respectively, to stand by the area of the Coral Sea with designs to intercept and destroy the incoming Japanese invasion and support fleets.

• On May 1 the two US CV TFs unite under the command of ADM Fletcher

o May 4, Fletcher detaches CV5 to attack recent Japanese positions on Tulagi

 CV5’s attacks are relatively successful, with damage inflicted on enemy positions and shipping in and around the harbor of Tulagi

• US losses are minimal

• By May 6, Fletcher is aware that Japanese CVs are in the area, and the Japanese invasion fleet is not far behind.  As a result, he detaches ADM Crace’s cruisers WITHOUT air cover to block the invasion force.

o This is potentially a critical blunder by Fletcher.  Crace’s CAs could have been blown out of the water by Japanese CVs, as it was, they were attacked three times by Japanese aircraft and once by MacArthur’s B17s.  

 Japanese reports stated that they had sunk a BB, damaged a second BB and a CA.  Japanese sent no further attacks towards Crace.  His vessels survived due to poor Japanese (and American) accuracy as well as his skillful maneuvering.  

 The sighting of the supposed BBs by the Japanese informed the invasion fleet to reverse course

 Still a horrible decision by Fletcher

• First day of the carrier battle May 7

• Early on the morning of the 7th, Japanese launch searches to find US CVs

o Japanese scout planes from Shokaku find US ships and radio ADM Tagaki of 1 CV, 1 CA, and 3 DD.

 What the Japanese actually sight is the detached oiler Neosho and her escort DD Sims.  

• How did the Japanese pilot screw this up this bad?

• Japanese arrive over oiler and DD, realize their mistake and continue their search, they return and attack and sink Sims and force Neosho to be abandonned

• At 0815 a CV5 SBD piloted by John Nielsen finds the Japanese screening force under ADM Goto, which includes light carrier Shoho.  

o An error in Nielsen’s coding made the message read 2 Japanese CVs instead of 1.

• Fletcher loses his mind on Nielsen when he lands and clarifies his message

 Believing this to be the main Japanese CV force, Fletcher