Episode Details

Sit Rep PTO late December 1941-January 1942

• Japanese are on the offensive everywhere
• Philippines are already on the way out
• Wake Island, despite a gallant defense by the Marines has been captured and the planned relief had been called off December 22.
• The fact that Wake Island had been abandoned by Admiral Pye lit a fire under Nimitz to strike back.
• Morale was extremely low in the fleet due to the fact that Wake had been abandoned.  
• Capt McMorris, Pye’s Chief of staff, said that retreating from Wake would be “unduly cautious” and a retreat would “destroy service and public confidence.  It is an opportunity unlikely to come again soon.  We are in great need of a victory.”
• Talk about the effect of Pye’s retreat order on the Carrier Force
• Aubrey Fitch withdrew to his cabin so he would not hear the mutinous talk on the bridge.
• Fliers on Saratoga threatened to ignore the order and launch anyway.
• Intel officer Edwin Layton said, “To lose to an enemy that fought you and you fought well was one thing.  But to lose because your own Admiral was a nervous Nellie was another.”
•  January 1942 was probably the worst month of the war in the Pacific as far as public knowledge and morale went.

• Admiral King wants to strike back
• In a cable dated January 2, 1942 King told Nimitz that he was not pleased with the “half-hearted” deployment of the CVs.
• He desired “Hit and Run” raids in the Marshalls and Gilberts.
• Talk about surprise raids to hit the outlying Japanese bases.
• Even though King wants to strike back, Nimitz’s advisers say don’t do it

• What can Nimitz strike back with?
• Talk about the carriers and their availability
• CV experience or lack thereof

• What are the risks of utilizing the CVs at this juncture?
• Who is expressing doubt?
• Admiral Bloch 14th Naval District responsible for defending Hawaii
• What were the arguments against a raid or raids?
• Bloch said that deploying the CVs on raids would leave Hawai’i dangerously exposed to further Jap assaults or invasion
• Intelligence on the Marshalls and Gilberts was scarce
• Little was known about the targets
• Didn’t think it was worth the risk
• Why take the risk?
• CVs were all we had
• Why raid in the first place and why the outer ring?
• Morale boost
• Japan focused on going south. – this would hit them in their “rear area”
• “Turning Movement” not the same as flank attack
• Possibly may divert Japanese attention from Australia and the Coral Sea
• Hitting the outer ring of islands was easier as there would be less of a threat from heavy Jap fleet units
• Would also protect Samoa and Australia by weakening the Jap airfields there

• The Marshall and Gilbert Islands Raid
• Nimitz confers with Admiral Halsey about the upcoming strike.
• Halsey is enthusiastic (no surprise here)
• Says that CVs should strike like General Nathan Bedford Forrest said about cavalry, “get to the other fellow first with everything you have and as fast as you can and dump it on him.”
• Halsey says he will take Enterprise to the Marshalls himself
• What strike isn’t with risk?
• Halsey says it’s important for the Navy’s self-respect
• Nimitz pulls the trigger
• Cryptanalysts state to Nimitz that radio traffic indicated a large Japanese fleet movement south, thereby putting the proposed targets out of range of major enemy fleet units
• Set for Feb 1
• Will comprise Task Force 8 built around Halsey and CV6 and TF 17 under Fletcher and CV5.         
• TF8 will strike the Marshalls in the am and if possible strike again that af